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Natural selection is Darwin’s solvent of 
metaphysics. It dissolved Aristotle’s final cause, 
teleology, into efficient cause, and now Leibniz’s 
pre-established harmony as well. (Willard Van 
Orman Quine)  
 
1. SCIENCE AS AN ARGUMENTATIVE ENTERPRISE 
Epistemological issues concerning the study of language have 
played a central part in the long and highly productive academic career of 
Marcelo Dascal. Dascal’s untiring interest in these questions has led him 
to investigate the history of ideas in such disparate areas as linguistics, 
philosophy, psychology, semiotics, and cognitive science – to name just a 
handful. More recently, he has riveted his eyes on controversies as they 
spring up every once in a while in the world of academics. For Dascal 
such controversies are far from being phenomena marginal to the history 
of science. Nor should they be regarded as random incidents that take 
place – as many innocently think they do – in stark contrast with what 
might otherwise be considered the long, steady, smooth, and uninter-
rupted march of science in pursuit of the ultimate truth about the world 
or whatever. No doubt, this latter view of science has a tremendous 
appeal to the man in the street who would rather think of the scientist as 
a person wholeheartedly dedicated to the progress of science and who is 
willing to sacrifice her material comforts for the sole purpose of co-
operating with her peers in a genuinely collective and totally disinterested 
enterprise called scientific research. In his more recent work, Dascal has 
shown that the layman’s view of science is highly romanticised and bears 
little semblance to what goes on really behind the curtains in academia. 
He is currently engaged in what he himself characterises as “a more 
ambitious project that places controversies at the centre of an account of 
the history of ideas, in science and elsewhere” (Dascal and Cremaschi 
(1999), p. 1130). 
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Now, to regard science as an enterprise marked by controversies 
and constant clashes of opinion amongst researchers with conflicting 
and competing views is to admit that scientific research is over and 
above everything else a human affair. The product of scientific enquiry 
may outlast the lives of the individual scientists involved in it and may 
even aspire to universal validity, far beyond the contingencies of the 
particular set of circumstances in which the scientists toil; but the activity 
itself of the scientists – the way they toil and come up with their findings 
– is one that is shot through with the multifarious implications of the 
crucial fact that it is conducted by human beings in the real world. In 
other words, it is pointless and misleading to look at the work of the 
scientist as anything but a form of human labour. Controversies arise in 
science because scientists are humans; and, insofar as they are humans, 
they are not exempt from such human feelings as the desire for 
recognition and career advancement, power to influence others and have 
a greater say in the various decision-making bodies, greater material 
comfort, and so on and so forth. Furthermore, scientists are part of the 
very same society as non-scientists and are subject to the very same 
aspirations and anxieties that other members of the society go through in 
their day-to-day lives. As Restivo ((1988), p. 5) put it very nicely: 
 
Even when I carry out scientific work – an activity which I can seldom 
conduct in direct association with other men – I perform a social, 
because human, act. It is not only the material of my activity – like the 
language itself which the thinker uses – which is given to me as a social 
product. My own existence itself is a social activity. 
 
My aim in this paper is to consider science as an argumentative 
endeavour and look at some of the important implications of holding 
such a view of science. By way of anticipating myself, I shall contend that 
one useful way of taking stock of the argumentative character of science 
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is to regard scientific discourse from a pragmatic perspective – a claim 
also explicitly made by Dascal. However, appearances aside, it will soon 
become clear that there are some important differences between us as to 
the role of pragmatics in scientific controversies which ultimately boil 
down to crucial differences as to what Pragmatics is all about. 
Furthermore, I shall contend that the theory of speech acts may provide 
a useful theoretical framework for comprehending what goes on in 
science, although speech act theory itself – as indeed it goes without 
saying – is a product of the very same activity it seeks to theorise and 
distance itself from. Once again, my understanding of the way speech 
acts work will turn out to be significantly different from what the 
proponents of the speech act theory in its received version would have 
us believe (cf. Rajagopalan (1984), (1993), (1998a), (1998d), (1998e), 
(2000 a), (2000b)).  
 
2. TWO WAYS OF INTERPRETING THE ARGUMENTATIVE 
NATURE OF SCIENCE 
Although a growing number of scholars today subscribe to the 
view that arguments and controversies constitute a substantial part of the 
history of a science, it is not at all clear that everyone understands the 
term ‘argument’ in the same manner. Broadly speaking, one may 
distinguish between two positions in regard to the role of arguments in 
the advancement of knowledge.  
According to one widely-held view, it is thanks to the fact that 
science is constitutively argumentative that scientists find themselves 
having to incessantly look for better and more accurate explanations for 
the problems they isolate and decide to zero in on. On this view, 
controversies are salutary in that they force scientists to hone their 
theoretical convictions against the whetstone of criticisms from their 
peers. Controversies and debates provide the ideal set of conditions that 
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prevent scientific hypotheses from degenerating into dogmas before they 
have been properly subjected to close scrutiny by other members of the 
scientific community and can be reasonably regarded as a plausible 
theoretical explanations. Controversies and debates are our guarantee 
that growth of knowledge is achieved through steps that are well chosen 
and that each new moment of approximation to the ultimate truth of 
scientific reality is checked and double-checked for its correctness and 
reliability. In other words, growth of scientific knowledge takes place 
through the exercise of scientific rationality and one way scientists make 
sure that they are on the path of rationality is by having their peers keep 
an ever-vigilant eye on each and every one of their steps. Arguments 
arise whenever a scientist suspects that one of her fellow-scientists has 
swerved from the path of scientific rationality. 
According to an alternative view, arguments are primarily 
exercises in rhetoric where rhetoric is understood, not as a means to an 
end, but an end itself. Truth is what gets established as such. And the so-
called ultimate truth is ultimate only to the extent that no one has yet 
been successful in showing that the story does not quite end where it has 
been claimed to end. This means, the notion of an ultimate truth or any 
other transcendental concept cannot be invoked as a point of reference 
in relation to which one may proceed to adjudge the relative merits and 
demerits of the contending factions in a controversy. Rather, 
controversies, including scientific controversies, are verbal battles; and 
just as it happens in all other battles, truth (i.e. whatever part of the old 
notion of truth one might nostalgically wish to harbour) is the first 
casualty in scientific battles as well. Scientific battles are invariably 
struggles over which of the contending parties is entitled to the truth of 
the matter; so truth is all a matter of which side has the upper hand in a 
controversy. The truth is the trophy of the victor in a scientific 
controversy. The truth of a scientific claim is to be decided solely in 
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terms of its success in the number of controversies through which it has 
managed to emerge unscathed. Truth is that which has not yet been 
knocked down and replaced by a contending view. To paraphrase 
Popper (1963) in a way that may not be entirely to his liking, truth is 
merely that which has not been falsified as yet; or, to put the point at its 
strongest, truth is that which is in principle falsifiable. 
 
3. DASCAL ON ARGUMENTS, SCIENTIFIC CONTROVERSIES, 
AND RATIONALITY 
Where does Dascal stand in relation to the two contending views 
about scientific argument adumbrated in the foregoing paragraph? In the 
paper by Dascal and Cremaschi (1999) referred to earlier on, the authors 
are careful to distance themselves from both the contending views, at 
least in their radical versions. After undertaking a minute analysis of the 
exchanges between Ricardo and Malthus in what is recorded in the 
annals of the history of science as a major cause célèbre and pointing out 
several instances of the use of argumentative stratagems and rhetorical 
trickery designed to sidestep argument rather than face it head-on, 
Dascal and Cremaschi ask: 
 
If this is how the exercise of criticism is supposed to lead to the growth 
of knowledge, one may well ask whether such a growth is indeed 
‘rational’. Perhaps, instead, Feyerabend, Foucault, or McCloskey are – 
each or all of them – right. Perhaps science ‘progresses’ not through a 
rational process, but rather through ‘anarchy’, power struggles, or the 
rhetorical manipulation of emotions. Unless one can show that this conclusion 
is unwarranted. (Dascal and Cremaschi, 1999, p. 1160; italics mine)  
 
Yet, referring specifically to the Malthus-Ricardo controversy, they also 
feel inclined not to embrace the diametrically opposite claim that it did 
contribute to the growth of knowledge in a straightforward and 
unproblematic way. Thus they say: 
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We have analyzed in detail one cycle in the Malthus-Ricardo 
correspondence. Can we say that this cycle has contributed to the 
‘growth of knowledge’? Can we say, for example, that it led to the 
discovery of new facts, to the establishment of new scientific laws? Can 
we say that it solved the problem of (the economic effect of the Corn 
Laws) it set out to discuss? The answer is certainly ‘No’ (Dascal and 
Cremaschi (1999), p. 1161) 
 
In plucking the two excerpts above out of their immediate contexts and 
juxtaposing them, my aim is to persuade the reader that, on the face of it, 
the two passages seem to be on a collision course. But the authors seem 
to want to have it both ways. For, either science progresses in a straight 
line or it doesn’t. If the Malthus-Ricardo exchange produced plenty of 
heat but no light, if the debate between the two stalwarts revealed clear 
signs of “ ‘anarchy’, power struggles, [and] the rhetorical manipulation of 
emotions” but did not lead “to the discovery of new facts, to the 
establishment of new scientific laws”, then, surely, something is seriously 
amiss in Dascal and Cremaschi’s reluctance to concede that Feyerabend, 
Foucault, and McCloskey may, after all, have a point when they claim 
that the notion of transcendent truth is not what is at issue in scientific 
controversies. How do Dascal and Cremaschi avoid a possible stalemate 
in their reasoning? The answer is that they opt for a ‘third way’. And the 
third way they advocate is paved with plenty of generosity when it comes 
to interpreting such key terms as ‘rationality’ and ‘knowledge’. 
Immediately following the passage just cited, the authors hasten to 
observe: 
 
If ‘growth of knowledge’ is taken to mean more data, solved problems, 
and agreement on the acceptance of a theory at the expense of another, 
our cycle did not contribute to it. If, however, this notion is reasonably 
broadened to include, say, the ‘growth of understanding’, then the 
answer is definitely ‘Yes’. (Dascal and Cremaschi (1999), p. 1161) 
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As regards what the authors identify as the Feyerabend-Foucault-
McCloskey orthodoxy, here is what they have to say:  
 
We think Feyerabend, Foucault, and McCloskey are right insofar as they 
have called attention to important aspects of the scientific enterprise that 
have been systematically overlooked by the idealized normative image of 
science that can be found in the writings of philosophers of science like 
Popper. Methodological opportunism, political struggle, and the 
temptation to achieve short-lived victory through persuasive tricks are 
indeed ever present in science, and can be observed at work precisely by 
looking at scientific controversies, which are not governed only – or 
even mainly – by lofty logical standards. What this means, however, is 
not that there is no ‘rationality’ at work in the workings of science; it only 
means that a particular kind of rationality, which equates reason with 
logic, is not found there. (Dascal and Cremaschi (1999), p. 1160) 
 
And the new form of rationality that emerges from the ensuing 
discussion is baptised ‘soft’ rationality.  
 
4. ‘SOFT RATIONALITY’ VS. STRICT LOGIC IN SCIENTIFIC 
CONTROVERSIES 
What exactly is the nature of ‘soft rationality’ is not fully made 
explicit by Dascal and Cremaschi, except for the claim that it is not 
subject to the strict laws of logic. Our first clue as to what the difference 
might be is made available when the authors equate the two types of 
rationality with Pragmatics and Semantics respectively. “Pragmatics is 
ruled by norms which ensure the intelligibility of communicative acts; 
such norms in contrast to semantic rules, are not algorithmic in nature, 
but rather heuristic” (Dascal and Cremaschi (1999), p. 1164). For Dascal 
and Cremaschi then, scientific controversies are first and foremost 
communicative events and must be analysed with the aid of pragmatics 
rather than semantics. Semantics is strictly truth-conditional, but since 
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there is much more in scientific discourse than semantics, it is foolhardy 
to expect that scientific controversies will be fully subject to the rules of 
logic. As Dascal put it in his 1983 book: 
 
When we present an argument, we count on the listener’s ability to 
supply the missing logical links including the obvious missing premisses. 
When we use deictic expressions, we count on the context to supply 
their referents. When we concatenate our discourse in terms of given-
new alternations, we count on the listener’s ability to find the appropriate 
‘bridge assumptions’ in case we fail to provide them explicitly. (Dascal 
(1983), p. 131) 
 
The above remark could be interpreted to mean that what makes actual 
scientific discourse and scientific controversies different from logical 
reasoning is that a lot is left unstated by the participants who require that 
their interlocutors (or, in the case of controversies, their adversaries) 
supply the missing elements by appealing to the context. In other words, 
under ideal conditions, scientific controversies should lead to perfect 
communication between the parties. Dascal’s reason for holding that in 
actual practice scientific controversies fall short of that ideal is 
presumably that it is conducted by humans and humans, after all, are, 
alas, too human. “The understanding we have been discussing is not 
some idyllic union of minds and hearts that poets (and perhaps also 
thinkers such as Martin Buber) are after. What we are talking about is 
understanding achieved through regular communication, and whatever 
rationality it possesses is at least the kind of rationality involved in 
communicative interaction” (Dascal and Cremaschi (1999), p. 1163).  
In other words, scientific controversies occur in conditions that 
are far from ideal. And the price we pay for this unfortunate state of 
affairs is that they rarely result in any appreciable growth of knowledge. 
The best that we can hope for is a growth of understanding – which is, 
let us not forget, no mean achievement. 
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To be sure, communicative understanding is also an impressive achie-
vement, given the ubiquity of misunderstanding, misrepresentation, and 
other forms of (alleged or real) communicative failure [....]. If natural 
languages were ‘transparent’ , i.e., if their semantic rules were sufficient to 
account for the meanings conveyed through their use, then 
communicative failures could not occur, and any allegations such a 
failure should be ascribed to mauvaise foi or illiteracy. But the use of 
natural languages is not transparent. More often than not we convey only 
implicitly and indirectly what we mean. Understanding thus always 
requires a complex inferential process whereby the speaker’s actual 
meaning is determined. The theory that seeks to account for such a 
process is pragmatics. (Dascal and Cremaschi (1999), p. 1163) 
    
5. SOFT RATIONALITY AND THE UNDERLYING VIEW OF 
LANGUAGE 
What is the view of natural language that underwrites the view 
entertained in the foregoing passage? Before we attempt an answer to 
this question, let us note that the word transparent is somewhat 
inappropriately used in the passage just cited. When the authors write “If 
natural languages were ‘transparent’ ” what they presumably mean to say 
is ‘fully explicit’, because what is alleged to stand between natural 
languages and the presumed ideal of perfect communication is the fact 
that meanings are often conveyed implicitly or indirectly. Transparency is 
opposed to opacity, not implicitness or indirectness.  
However, I want to insist that Dascal and Cremaschi are indeed 
lamenting that natural languages are – alas! – unfortunately opaque, albeit 
in a sense altogether different from the one they are willing to admit. For 
the whole argument being advanced by the authors is premised on the 
key assumption that ordinary everyday language (as opposed to the 
formal language of mathematical logic) disguises thought. If the opacity 
is due to distortion and if distortion in turn turns out to be one of the 
design features of ordinary language, then it is not the usual apparatus of 
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Gricean maxims and inferential rules that will do the job. For the job is 
no longer one of retrieving lost or missing information; it is one of 
ferreting out meanings that are often deliberately being withheld as well 
as meanings that unfold under appropriate prodding and, that too, in 
ways unbeknownst to the speakers and in spite of their best efforts to 
repress them. 
That language disguises thought is not in itself an outrageously 
outlandish idea. Among the respectable names with which one finds 
such a view of language associated is the early Wittgenstein. As a matter 
of fact, the idea that natural languages are opaque may, for all we know, 
turn out to be the most durable of our culture’s fundamental 
assumptions about language and one which is well ensconced in a time-
honoured metaphysics whose echoes are to be heard in such apparently 
unconnected things as the Biblical tale of the Tower of Babel and 
Leibniz’s belief in the absolute perfection of the language of mathematics 
and his certainty that God Almighty must have at His disposal such a 
perfect language. In a perfect language, one will be able to express one’s 
thoughts without the need to first convert mental concepts into physical 
signs. A perfect language will therefore be qualitatively different from 
natural human languages in that it need not have any material realisation 
whatsoever. A perfect language is a language whose existence is wholly 
virtual. 
The idea of opacity arises from the fundamental assumption that 
language acts as a tertium quid between the human mind and the world at 
large. Since language stands between the world of reality and the sentient 
mind, it is potentially capable of distorting it. For die-hard idealists like 
Berkeley and Hume that is a permanent possibility and against which 
there is no safeguard whatsoever, so that scepticism is what awaits us at 
the end of the road. For realists and others who are less pessimistically 
inclined, one can always beat language at its own game, provided one has 
©Manuscrito, 2002.                                                  XXV(2), pp. 433-464, October. 
KANAVILLIL RAJAGOPALAN 444 
the necessary will to do it and has done one’s homework properly, with 
plenty of exercises in Gricean pragmatics and all the rest. If only to 
complete the picture, there are also the Rortyan pragmatists who would 
rather have us forget about the whole thing because, in their view, the 
idea that language acts as an intermediary – a filter, if you like – between 
the mind and the world has only made us waste our precious time in 
such idle concerns as mainstream philosophy.  
 
6. SOFT RATIONALITY AND THE PROBLEM OF DISTINGUI-
SHING IT FROM HARD RATIONALITY 
For Dacal, thus, what makes scientific controversies all too often 
inconclusive and not conducive to the growth of knowledge in the 
rigorous sense is that they are – alas!! – conducted in ordinary language 
as opposed to a logically perfect language where not only would there be 
no implicitness or indirectness, there would be no opacity whatsoever, 
either (For, as already seen, if it were simply a matter of implicitness or 
indirectness, a pragmatic theory adequately bolstered by insights from 
Grice would resolve all our woes). 
Soft rationality is thus qualitatively opposed to hard rationality, or 
so it would seem. Such a conclusion would seem to be warranted by the 
claim that, unlike the exercise of hard rationality that results in the 
growth of knowledge, the exercise of soft rationality leads to the 
advancement of understanding. And understanding in turn is claimed be 
a collective rather than individual achievement (cf. Dascal (1985), (1987), 
(1989)). Furthermore, it does not consist in the deepening of awareness 
of what is already there in place. The object of understanding – call it 
consensus or a common meeting point – is actually the outcome of a 
process rather than a pre-condition for it. This is how Dascal and 
Cremaschi spell out their claim:  
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Mutual understanding [...] does not consist in the discovery of an initially 
hidden meaning, but rather in the joint – even though conflictual – 
construction of such a meaning. It is an achievement of the contenders, 
which can only be understood – in fact ‘reconstructed’ – by an external 
observer if the polemic context where it develops is taken into account. 
(Dascal and Cremaschi (1999), p. 1162) 
 
Or, as Dascal put it elsewhere: 
 
Controversies can in fact terminate without agreement, without thereby 
becoming disputes. What is interesting is that even in such cases they are 
perceived by the participants and analysts alike as ‘productive’. That is, 
although they do not permit even a tilting of the balance in favor of one 
of the positions in conflict, they make a cognitive or epistemic 
contribution: they clarify the problem, they permit one to identify 
conceptual or methodological divergencies or difficulties, they reorient 
the research effort, or simply they produce ‘understanding’ (Dascal, 
Ms:9) 
 
But Dascal is not always consistent on this question. For there are 
other moments when he seems to want to say that soft rationality is not 
necessarily in a relationship of mutual exclusion with its hard 
counterpart, but in a relation of partial overlapping. This latter reading 
suggests itself when Dascal and Cremaschi equate the 
knowledge/understanding distinction on the one hand and the 
distinction between soft and hard rationalities on the other with the 
distinction between semantics and pragmatics – or rather, one way of 
characterising the distinction.  
Before examining the parallel claimed by the authors amongst the 
three binary sets, let us recall that scholars have long been known to hold 
widely different opinions concerning the semantics/ pragmatics divide. 
The gamut of proposals include the plea for an integrated pragmatics 
(Ducrot (1972), Vogt (1977)), ‘garden variety semantics’ (Lakoff (1972)), 
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a semantics/pragmatics divide with “open and permeable borders” 
(Mittwoch (1976)) – to name just a few. Dascal’s own approach to the 
problem is best understood in light of the following statement: 
 
Language and other semiotic systems are not only instruments of 
communication but also instruments of our own thought. Linguistic and 
non-linguistic signs play an essential role in our mental processes, 
particularly in higher level cognitive processes and states. (Dascal (1983), 
p. 44) 
 
Assuming for the sake of the argument that scientific controversies 
involve some ‘higher level cognitive processes and states,’ Dascal could 
be seen as claiming that pragmatics should be taken to cover not just the 
communicative side of language use but also that aspect of language use 
that is strictly non-communicative and fundamentally introspective and 
involves a series of mental operations. Accordingly, Dascal pleads for 
two distinct subdomains of pragmatics which he calls ‘psychopragmatics’ 
and ‘sociopragmatics’.  
 
If pragmatics is a theory of the use of language, the investigation of the 
calculative, as well as other mental uses of language, belongs de jure to its 
domain. I propose to call this subdomain of pragmatics 
‘psychopragmatics’, to distinguish it from its other main subdomain, 
namely ‘sociopragmatics’, which is concerned with the communicative 
use of language. (Dascal (1983), p. 45) 
 
To go back to the semantics/pragmatics distinction and its 
relation to the distinction between knowledge and understanding on the 
one hand and between hard rationality and soft rationality on the other, 
Dascal and Cremaschi claim: 
 
Th[e] content [of the speaker’s linguistic behaviour] is not forever fixed 
by the semantics rules of the language. It must be inferentially construed 
on the basis of the semantics of the utterance cum contextual and co-
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textual information. Pragmatics, therefore, does not replace semantics but rather 
cohabits with it. Pragmatics permits one to use that system in a flexible way, 
occasionally violating its rules, without thereby sacrificing intelligibility. (italics mine) 
(Dascal and Cremaschi (1999), p. 1163) 
 
To be sure, such a way of putting things changes the picture significantly. 
Contrary to our earlier impression that hard and soft rationalities have 
mutually exclusive domains, it now turns out either that their domains 
somewhat overlap or that they may both be at work in certain discursive 
domains including, notably, scientific controversies. The upshot of this is 
the prospect that controversies may produce not just ‘understanding’ but 
‘knowledge’ because the parties involved may, unbeknownst to 
themselves, hit the very heart of their bone of contention namely its 
semantics and, with it, its hard rationality. Because all that is claimed is 
that the pragmatics of communicative understanding may occasionally 
bend the semantics of each other’s arguments and hence equally oc-
casionally depart from the hard rationality of robust syllogistic reasoning – 
which, being algorithmic through and through, admits of nothing but 
direct hits: there being no room for humming and hawing, nor 
haphazard or slovenly reasoning. The problem now is that even if 
genuine knowledge is attained – mind you, by happestance rather than 
design – neither side would be any the wiser for that!!!  
 
7. SOFT RATIONALITY VS. THE SOFT UNDERBELLY OF 
RATIONALITY 
What the discussion so far has revealed is that there are two 
conflicting views about soft rationality and its relation with hard 
rationality which contribute to obfuscating rather than clarifying matters. 
According to one view, explicitly advocated by Dascal and Cremaschi, 
the two types of rationality are wide apart, one leading to genuine 
knowledge and the other paving the way for understanding. Knowledge 
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consists in a deeper awareness of what is already known to exist, it is 
added on to what is already agreed to be available to one and all. 
Understanding is what gets constructed dialogically; the more we talk – 
even if we shout at each other in order to give vent to our differences – 
the chances are that we might begin to understand each other better. 
Understanding does not produce knowledge but – as one might suppose 
– provides the ideal intellectual ‘climate’ for the generation of knowledge. 
According to the alternative view, also discernible from Dascal and 
Cremaschi’s paper, the parties involved in a scientific controversy may 
occasionally hit upon genuine knowledge but they will have no way of 
knowing for sure that part of what they think they have created or 
constructed through their willingness to talk is in point of fact precious 
knowledge, a deepening of what was already there in place and which – 
alas!! – they are prevented from ever coming to identify as such. If 
knowledge, as one fashionable definition would have it, is demonstrably 
true belief, what the parties in dispute accidentally hit upon can, given 
the terms of Dascal and Cremaschi’s theoretical rigmarole, never be 
genuine knowledge because, although it may turn out to be true, it will not 
have been demonstrated to be true or acknowledged as such by either 
side. When all is said and done, what is conspicuously missing in Dascal’s 
analysis of how scientific controversies work and have the positive 
consequences that they are claimed to have is a clear account of how it is 
(if it is possible at all) that one can hope to move from understanding to 
knowledge, from soft rationality to hard rationality. 
What the discussion so far seems to lead up to is the conclusion 
that, rather than positing a softer form of rationality and trying to figure 
out how one may move from there to the world of pure rationality, 
uncontaminated by the vagaries of natural languages, one might do 
better to look more closely at rationality itself and wonder if it has a 
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highly vulnerable soft underbelly – that for whatever reason has 
customarily escaped our gaze.  
 
8. INTERROGATING THE RATIONALITY OF REASON AND THE 
REASON BEHIND RATIONALITY 
8. 1. Rationaliy as a Given 
The major problem with the proposal by Dascal and Cremaschi 
has to do with what they take as given, rather than what they propose as 
part of their explanation as to how scientific controversies are important 
even whey do not terminate with tangible results. For Dascal and 
Cremaschi seem to presuppose that the only form of reasoning that can 
incontrovertibly yield concrete results and with it genuine knowledge is 
logical reasoning. I am not saying that Dascal is committed to the thesis 
that logic is reasoning at its most rigorous and that, furthermore, all 
other forms of reasoning, including the sort of reasoning carried out in 
scientific controversies, must be defined in relation to it, or rather, in 
terms of their degree of departure from it. But he certainly talks as if he 
is perfectly happy with such a view of logic and certainly finds no reason 
for calling it into question.  
In the remaining part of my paper, I wish to sustain the claim that 
an interesting avenue we may try by way of rectifying the impasse 
identified earlier on is to begin by questioning the veracity of the very 
presupposition just identified. Now, to be fair to Dascal, he has 
consistently shown clear awareness of the fact that, in an all-out 
controversy, there need not be anything at all that the adversaries agree 
upon.  
 
To look at controversies (and at the criticism therein practiced) as 
‘valuable’ just in case they lead to a clearcut decision as to which of the 
opposing theories should be ‘accepted’ and which ‘rejected’ by the 
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Supreme Court of Reason (embodied in the absolutely impartial 
judgment of an ideal Scientific Community) is to overlook the fact that 
controversies [very often] call into question, among other things, the very 
‘laws’ and ‘procedures’ according to which such      a Court is supposed 
to judge. (Dascal and Cremaschi (1999), pp. 1160-1) 
 
But then, no sooner have the authors taken such a bold step than they 
beat a tactical retreat – or so one should think – presumably upon being 
alarmed by the prospect that they may be poised to skid down the 
slippery slope of Feyerabend-Foucault-McCloskey brand of scepticism. 
Thus, the bold statement in the foregoing passage is immediately 
followed by the following words of self-restraint: 
 
That is to say, it is to overlook the possibly radical character of the 
differences between the contenders, i.e. strict logic. Such a view implies 
that, whenever such radical differences occur – as they do in fact occur – 
the controversy lies beyond the jurisdiction of reason, i.e., it is not 
properly viewed as a ‘scientific’ controversy, but rather an ideological 
one, where rationality has little or no role whatsoever (cf. Popper...). 
Adopting such a view, therefore, would be to play straightforwardly into 
the hands of the Feyerabend-Foucault-McCloskey, and also of the early 
Kuhn, in so far as it would amount to admitting that the actual process of 
scientific ‘progress’ – where controversies play a decisive role – is the 
result of factors alien to the concept of rationality. (Dascal and 
Cremaschi (1999), p. 1161) 
 
In other words, the farthest Dascal is willing to go in characterising the 
radical nature of the differences in a scientific controversy is the point 
when a step beyond would have (in his view) the disastrous consequence 
of letting the unholy triumvirate of irrationality – the Feyerabend-
Foucault-McCloskey trinity – get away with the final laugh. In other 
words, Dascal is prepared to negotiate even the proverbial claim of 
infallibility of ‘strict logic’ – thought by many to be the paradigm of all 
reasoning – provided the idea of rationality itself is conceded to be 
sacrosanct and unnegotiable, no matter how radical the differences 
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between the contending parties in a scientific controversy. For Dascal 
this is imperative, lest a controversy should be allowed to degenerate into 
a dispute (Dascal, Ms-2: 6). Or, as he puts it elsewhere (no doubt, in tune 
with a highly prestigious line of thought in mainstream pragmatic 
research), 
 
Assumptions of rationality play a key role in most current accounts of 
the nature of ordinary communication. Communication, on these 
accounts, is a goal-oriented, cooperative process. At the very least, in 
order to be able to achieve their communicative (and other) goals in such 
a process, interlocutors must share some notion of the effective available 
means of achieving such goals, and must presume that each other abides, 
on the whole, by criteria of choice that optimize effectiveness (Dascal 
and Wróblewski (1991), p. 421) 
 
When all is said and done, Dascal’s claim that scientific controversies do 
contribute to the advancement of understanding (though not necessarily 
– and for that matter knowably) is based on his conviction that if the 
heated exchanges did not take place within the confines dictated by 
rationality they would not be scientific to begin with. In the final analysis, 
then, the whole argument is a semantic one. It says that science is 
rational, so a discussion amongst scientists that does not obey the 
dictates of reason cannot be considered scientific – or in terms of a 
three-way terminological distinction proposed in Dascal (Ms-2), such a 
discussion will not qualify as a controversy but will degenerate into a 
dispute which is “rooted in differences of attitude, feelings, or 
preferences” (Dascal, Ms-2: 6). What started off as an epistemological 
issue has suddenly metamorphosed into a semantic one. The answer to 
the question “How do you know for sure that a scientific controversy 
will never overstep the limits of rationality? “ will simply be “I speak 
English, damn it, and scientific is an English word and I know when it is 
being correctly used and when it isn’t. If a controversy goes beyond the 
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limits of rationality, it will no longer be scientific; it is as simple as that”. 
The incredulous interlocutor who persists and points out “But, hold on a 
minute, I know one famous instance where ...” is most certain to be 
silenced by what the logicians refer to as a ‘No true Scotsman argument’ 
of the sort: “But, well, what you are calling a scientific controversy is not 
quite scientific in the relevant sense of the word” 
 
8.2 The Crisis of Rationality 
Can such unconditional allegiance to rationality itself be justified 
rationally? The answer is an emphatic ‘No’. But this has hardly 
disheartened the die-hard advocates of rationality. The only hitch is that 
this is exactly the point where the dividing line between reason and faith, 
between science and ideology, between truth and dogma becomes 
extremely tenuous. For, unwillingness to discuss the putative 
unquestionableness of rationality or insistence to the effect that 
rationality itself cannot be rationally justified amounts to saying that 
rationality is a matter of faith, that science is itself one form ideology, and 
that the thesis of the unassailability of truth is at bottom nothing but a 
dogma. It is, much against Dascal’s caution not to play into the hands of 
Feyerabend and Co., to invite the pithy and ironic remark from 
Feyerabend to the effect: “If you are keen on waging a war against 
ideology, by all means, go ahead. But make sure you target all ideologies, 
science included” (cf. Feyerabend (1981); Rajagopalan (1999b)). 
As it happens, recalcitrant voices that increasingly call into 
question the absolute primacy of reason are no longer neither few nor far 
between. In the words of Calvin Schrag, 
 
Reason itself, particularly in our time, has become a problem. We can no 
longer proceed with an untroublesome concept of reason as the ground 
for philosophical and scientific knowledge. We must submit reason itself 
to a radical critique (Schrag (1980), p. 103). 
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Schrag for one is thus willing to push the limits of radical criticism 
farther than Dascal is willing to go. Or, as Liberman puts it, 
 
In logic and mathematics (since Wittgenstein and Gödel), in physics 
(since Heisenberg), in history and sociology (since Gadamer and 
Garfinkel) and in art and literature (since Picasso and Joyce), the 
Aristotelian logos of Western man – that of a rationality certain of itself 
investigating the truth of a world presumed to exist just in the way it is 
being interrogated – has been unravelling. The term of popularity is 
“deconstruction”, but its discovery reached its philosophical age of 
maturity before that fashionable term with the investigations of 
phenomenologists, investigations which discovered (as much as 
demonstrated) that we can no longer presume as an inheritance that 
there is a secured ground for all reasoned judging. (Liberman (1986), p. 
113) 
 
8.3 Struggle for Different Rationalities 
I shall wrap up my critical foray into Dascal’s views on scientific 
controversies by examining a cause célèbre among recent controversies in 
the philosophy of language – the one between the French philosopher 
Jacques Derrida and his North-American counterpart, John Searle. This 
case is especially interesting in that opinions are sharply divided as to 
who got the better of the other or, for that matter, if there was any 
fruitful discussion at all. Predictably thus, for Dascal, the Derrida-Searle 
encounter is primarily a classificatory problem: that is, one of deciding, 
first of all, to which of the three categories – discussion, dispute, and 
controversy – the episode in question must be assigned. 
To get matters clearer, let us briefly look at the grounds for the 
three-way distinction. In Dascal’s terminology, a discussion is a polemical 
exchange and has as its object a “well-circumscribed topic or problem” 
(Dascal, Ms-2: 6) and usually ends up with the contenders co-operatively 
arriving at a mutually satisfactory solution. A dispute too is a polemical 
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exchange but its object is a “well-defined divergence” and, as already 
seen, “rooted in differences of attitude, feelings, or preferences”. A 
controversy is a polemical exchange as well – in fact, being a polemical 
exchange is the one common denominator that makes all three 
comparable – which “begin[s] with a specific problem, but [...] spreads 
quickly to other problems and reveals profound differences”. Dascal 
hastens to note that controversies do not get “reduced to mere 
unsolvable conflicts of preferences” . 
How do we know that a given conflict has been adequately 
resolved? Dascal’s answer is: “Since ‘dissolution’ is a form of closure 
that, ultimately, remains ‘external’ both to the topic under dispute and to 
the participants’ beliefs and attitudes [...]”, the external authority is the 
scientific community at large. It is the members of the scientific 
community who will decide who has won. At no moment does Dascal 
pause to wonder how it is that the community goes about deciding who 
has won. Or, for that matter, what happens if the community cannot 
come to a decision as to who has won. Much less still, what are the 
mechanisms and stratagems that are brought to bear on the issue in 
order to, say, force the community decision one way or another. 
I suggest that an investigation into these questions – that properly 
speaking belong to the realm of ‘sociology of knowledge’ rather than 
‘philosophy of science’ or ‘epistemology of scientific investigation’ – may 
reveal precious insights into how scientific controversies evolve and are 
adjudged post hoc. Now, Dascal is absolutely right in his observation that, 
in the Derrida-Searle confrontation, it is simply impossible to say, in 
terms of his own three-way distinction, whether the exchange was a 
discussion, controversy, or a dispute.  
 
From the outset it is clear that this topic should engender a controversy 
rather than a discussion, since the contenders are well aware that they 
belong to radically different philosophical paradigms, which question 
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each other’s most basic assumptions and methods. Searle, however, opts 
to treat the debate as a discussion, by attempting to show that Derrida’s 
reading of Austin is simply mistaken, and therefore refutable. He 
assumes thereby that the interpretation of a (philosophical) text is a 
decidable matter, and that his own decision-procedure is the one that 
must be applied in order to settle the issue. Derrida’s response consists in 
questioning the assumptions underlying Searle’s decision-procedure, 
which – according to him – need to be set aside in order to allow for a 
deeper understanding of Austin. At this point Derrida, although 
ostensively relying upon the ‘obvious’ controversial character of the 
opposition at stake, may be simply trying to impose upon his opponent 
the ‘rules’ of his own (Derrida’s) ‘language game’. In other words, he too 
may be treating the debate, at this stage, as a discussion. When, finally, 
both contenders’ attempts to transform the debate into a discussion 
abiding by each one’s rules fail, both seem to shift to its perception as 
rather a hopeless dispute. (Dascal, Ms-2: 7) 
 
Three are some crucial moves in the reasoning above that deserve 
a closer look. What makes it the case that what should have engendered 
a controversy was hijacked by one of the contenders and transformed 
into a discussion? From whose perspective are we making such claims? 
When Dascal claims that, in his response to Searle, Derrida too was 
probably treating the whole affair as a debate – albeit, in his own sense, 
different from that of Searle – isn’t he also conceding that the word 
debate may, after all, not have a universal application – i.e., what is a 
debate in the eyes of someone may be a dispute in the eyes of another? 
In other words, the fact (assuming that it is one) that Derrida too sees 
the exchange as a debate does not mean that the two are in a position to 
come to an understanding in Dascal’s terms, i.e., by the exercise of a 
commonly agreed upon ‘soft’ rationality – simply because what is at stake 
is precisely a question as to what sort of rationality can be brought to 
bear on issues such as the one at hand. 
The upshot of these considerations is that the whole attempt to 
describe the whole episode from a neutral or non-committal perspective 
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is hopeless from the very start. For, as Henderson ((1994), p. 627) put it, 
“Epistemology is properly a normative discipline” (emphasis added). And 
because it is normative and not descriptive, any claim made as to what 
the correct description of a given verbal exchange between scientists 
should be will necessarily be value-laden (Rajagopalan (1984), (1993), 
(1998c), (1998d)). Any attempt to adjudge who the winner is or what the 
precise characterisation of the exchange should be is bound to be itself a 
gesture of intervening in the exchange and taking sides one way or the 
other. What this amounts to is that, strictly speaking, one cannot separate 
the history of a science from science itself (Rajagopalan (1989)). Or, as 
Nerlich and Clarke ((1994), p. 439) put it more recently: “In a scientific 
discipline, there is no clear distinction between the history of the 
discipline and the discipline itself.” 
Which is not – it is important to stress – the same thing as saying 
that scientific controversies are ultimately undecidable. They are 
undecidable only so long as one persists in approaching the whole issue 
armed with the tools of the trade available in conventional epistemology. 
That is to say, the issue becomes hopelessly muddled only if we insist on 
asking which of the contending parties is getting us closer to the truth or 
at what precise point can we conclude that the exchange is generating 
some understanding – i.e., not just plenty of heat but some amount of 
light as well, no matter how dim. These are questions that properly 
belong to the sphere of sociology of knowledge rather than 
epistemology. For, the question as to who has won in a scientific battle 
of wits is ultimately decided by the scientific community at large and the 
members of the scientific community decide such issues on the basis of 
the balance of power that is perceived to hold once the dust has settled 
on the battlefield.  
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It is for this reason that scientific controversies frequently take on 
political connotations. The political fallout of the Derrida-Searle 
exchange is no longer a secret. In the words of Payne: 
 
What began as a serious philosophical debate – in part over a reading of 
Austin – finally spilled over into a running scandal in the pages of The 
New York Review of Books and in an attempt by the president of the 
American Philosophical Association to convince the French government 
to veto the unanimous election of Derrida as Director of the 
International College of Philosophy on the charge of obscurantisme 
terroriste. (Payne (1995), p. 6) 
 
In the effort to knock down the adversary, no weapon is discarded. 
Branding your opponent as a non-philosopher or non-scientist is one 
that the philosophical establishment has time and again used with great 
effectiveness against powerful adversaries that include Nietzsche and the 
later Wittgenstein (cf. Rajagopalan (1998a), (1998e), (2000a)) – and also 
Derrida (cf. Rajagopalan (1993)). In the aftermath of the debate with 
Derrida, Searle has frequently been asking the rhetorical question as to 
why it is that Derridean deconstruction has won over sympathisers only 
in the English departments in the English-speaking world – meaning, as 
its unmistakable sub-text, that Derrida, like Nietzsche before him, can at 
best hope to impress people are who have a literary bent and who, by 
definition (given the notorious stand-off between philosophy and 
literature), cannot be philosophers.  
 
9. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Scientific controversies are part of academic discourse whose 
reigning metaphor is that of war (Lakoff and Johnson (1980)). There is 
no more reason to think that scientific controversies will be conducted in 
any way other than the way wars are waged than there is to believe that 
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academic discourse will be any different from what it is and has always 
been, at least within the span of living memory. For all we know, the 
spirit of belligerency may be, as Lyotard has insisted, of the very essence 
in so far as the human faculty of speech is concerned. In Lyotard’s 
formulation, “To speak is to fight [...] and speech acts fall within the 
domain of a general agonistics” (Lyotard (1979), p. 10)  
Lyotard is alluding to one way of interpreting the Austinian 
notion of speech acts differently from the way Searle went on to 
transform it into a workable theory. Searle’s interpretation of Austin’s 
thoughts consisted primarily in realigning them with a long tradition of 
thinking about language according to which the primary function of 
language was that of stating facts. Unlike Austin who showed clear signs 
of wanting to break with that tradition, Searle was all too happy 
reintroducing into the theory the notion of proposition (time-honoured 
truth-value bearers) and thus make the notion of truth a central 
component of the theory (Rajagopalan (1990), (2000a)). Lyotard and 
others (amongst whom one may list McCloskey) who follow a non-
Searlesque approach to speech acts are saying that a speech act of 
assertion is not necessarily (or in any principled way) anchored to the 
truth of the proposition asserted therein. A speech act of assertion is not 
thereby an assertion of truth; it is only a claim to the effect that the 
speaker believes he is asserting the truth (This is one way to handle 
Moore’s paradox). Likewise, the one who denies the truth-claim made by 
one’s interlocutor is making an alternative claim for the same truth. Now, 
ceteris paribus, one of the interlocutors must have hit upon the real truth 
(assuming that the other presuppositions are satisfied in the relevant 
sense) but neither side can possibly have any guarantee of it over and 
above a personal conviction of having done it – and a public 
endorsement of their having done it by the community at large. In other 
words, there is no logical or otherwise certain move from the speech act 
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of assertion to the truth of the asserted proposition (Rajagopalan (1982)). 
If the community at large does come to accept the truth claimed by 
means of a speech act of assertion, it will not be thanks to the logical 
force of the argument advanced by the speaker but by the fact that 
possible dissent to the claim was simply muted by the overwhelming 
prestige of the speaker or someone else whose authority the speaker 
successfully invoked (argumentum ad vericundiam), the sheer rhetorical 
power of the argument itself or a covert menace implied therein 
(argumentum ad baculum), the fact that the argument in question involved 
the hearers at a personal level (argumentum ad hominem), and so on. In 
McCloskey’s words,  
 
Scientific assertions are speech-acts made in a scene of scientific tradition 
by the scientist-agent, through the agency of the usual tropes, for 
purposes of describing nature or mankind better than the next fellow [...] 
The error is to think that one is engaged in the propositional act, which 
is a matter of formal logic, when in fact one is engaged – all day, most 
days – in illocutionary acts, which are rhetorical (McCloskey (1984), pp. 
105-6) 
 
The winner takes it all. To the winner goes the spoils of war and 
with it the right to write the history of the war. Understanding is nothing 
but a euphemism for the state of détente that emerges after that the 
contending parties have already been through a series of bouts and 
decided that that is just as far as they can go. Understanding is the state 
of uneasy truce that results from the general perception that neither side 
is in a position to win outright or score a decisive victory over the other. 
Dascal’s difficulty in showing how understanding can ultimately lead to 
the growth of knowledge in a principled way has to do with the fact that 
there is no such thing as a smooth passage from sociology of knowledge 
to classical epistemology.  
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